My latest essay on War on the Rocks. Please go to the web site at this link to read the entire piece.

http://warontherocks.com/2013/11/threats-and-the-words-we-use-a-thought-experiment/

THREATS AND THE WORDS WE USE: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

David Maxwell

http://warontherocks.com/2013/11/threats-and-the-words-we-use-a-thought-experiment/

November 8, 2013 · in Commentary and Analysis

All forms of warfare: nuclear, conventional, and unconventional are complex and the US must adequately prepare for them all, balancing the training and resourcing for each. Perhaps most important policy makers and strategists must possess the intellectual rigor to understand, explain and address these threats with policies and strategies that will serve US interests. To illustrate this I offer this thought experiment.

Pull out a pad of paper or open a blank word document.

Now, choose any threat in the world that the United States or its allies face, from Al Qaeda to Iran to drug cartels to North Korea to Syria, to Boko Haram or Al Shabaab or any other threat of interest and importance.

Once you’ve chosen your threat, list American interests vis-à-vis that state or movement and then list the strategic aim(s) that will support those interests. Next, determine the end state required to achieve the strategic aim. Third, identify the operational objectives that will produce the end state. Then determine the sequence of actions most likely to achieve the operational objectives. Finally, organize and apply the resources of the government agencies to include the military to accomplish the sequence of actions.

Now, go back and see if you used any military doctrinal terms or defense-speak buzzwords. If you have, go back and start over. You can only use common English words that people outside of the defense community will be able to understand.

If you manage this, your strategy will be understood by military and civilian officials, by friends, partners, or allies, but also, and perhaps most importantly, by the American press and public. You will likely have described elements of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), stability operations, and unconventional warfare, among others – without actually using those terms, which are too often deployed as shortcuts that allow us to circumvent deep and clear thinking. And you will have thought more deeply about the strategy necessary to address the threat.

You might now be thinking, why do we use these terms at all?

Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian philosopher of war so often cited here at War on the Rocks, wisely counseled that before you embark on war you must first understand it. In American military circles, we have flipped that on its head and instead first rush to brand it with an acronym-friendly term to fight it before we truly grasp the characteristics of the conflict. The great strategic thinker, Colin Gray once wrote “The American defense community is especially prone to capture by the latest catchphrase, the new-sounding spin on an ancient idea which as jargon separates those who are truly expert from the lesser breeds without the jargon.” Thus were born (or actually reborn in the case of COIN) such terms as Irregular Warfare, Insurgency and COIN, Nation-Building, Stability Operations; Stability, Security, Transition, Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO); Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW); Capacity Building; Organization, Training Equipping, Rebuilding and Advising (OTERO); Security Force Assistance (SFA), Building Partner Capacity (BPC), Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA), and the Direct and Indirect. All of the above new sounding catchphrases are grounded in ancient human ideas and activities.

This brings us to what I like to call the “COIN pendulum,” which I believe is about to swing again. Consider the ends of the pendulum swing since 1975. Two anecdotes will illustrate the distance between the two.

In the 1980’s one of my mentors was asked to resurrect a COIN course at Fort Leavenworth. He contacted various Army schools and talked to doctrine writers and librarians and was told that after 1975 they were directed by “higher authority” to remove all COIN materials from their files, thanks to Vietnam’s supposed discrediting of COIN doctrine. The only school that maintained some form of COIN doctrine was the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. However, it was no longer referred to as COIN, but rather as Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Some prescient action officer at Fort Bragg helped to protect COIN theory and doctrine by renaming it and putting it in the proper perspective:

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (Joint Publication 1-02)

FID turned out to be a very useful doctrinal concept that has major advantages when compared to the “third-party” counterinsurgency campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. The FID approach is focused on providing external support to the host nation government counter its own insurgency rather than external forces conducting COIN themselves. It provides an option for policy makers and strategists to employ Ameircan military forces (both conventional and special operations) in ways that do not require a large footprint or the “expeditionary COIN” conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Swing forward to the post-9-11 era.

(Continued at War On The Rocks at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2013/11/threats-and-the-words-we-use-a-thought-experiment/

JOINT DOCTRINE FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

I would say that as much as we need Joint UW Doctrine we need an interagency framework as well.  

But most importantly: We need Strategists and Policy makers who have a deep understanding of and value the strategic options of UW and Counter-UW. 

V/R

Dave

http://www.alsa.mil/library/alsb/ALSB%202013-1.pdf

 JOINT DOCTRINE FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 

 By Maj. Robert S. Burrell, USMC 

Warfare in the 21st Century has changed, and the use of large conventional military forces to achieve the United States’ (US’) objectives, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, has proven a costly and dangerous option for addressing today’s security challenges. Irregular threats – derived from terrorist organizations, intrastate competition, weak and failing states, transnational crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – have superseded the danger of state versus state confrontation with traditional military weapons and battlefield tactics.1 

 The US appears unprepared to successfully influence rapidly evolving aspects of regional instability. In January 2011, social media (e.g., blogs, social-network sites, video sharing, and Twitter) played a significant role in organizing and sustaining mass protest in Egypt, a major US ally.2 In a mere eighteen days, a change in Egyptian government transpired, significantly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.3 In February 2011, a rapid Libyan rebellion caught the US off guard, creating more opportunities for non-state actors like the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda to influence the political landscape. In 2011 and 2012, the US appeared unable to successfully influence a Syrian revolutionary movement toward one consistent with democracy and human rights, as opposed to the intolerance and radicalism of the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda.4 Even more disconcerting, the growing collaboration of transnational criminal organizations with terrorist organizations in ungoverned spaces (e.g., Northwestern Africa) poses a serious threat to international security. 

Irregular threats are not confined to the Middle East and Northern Africa. After six years of repulsive violence in Mexico, an estimated 47,000 people have died as a result of conflict with transnational criminal organizations. US objectives to end government corruption and provide stability in its nearest neighbor have proven unsuccessful, and the potential of a failed state remains.5 In order to effectively counter emerging irregular threats, the US should develop joint doctrine for unconventional warfare (UW). 

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 

UW is an increasingly viable US strategic option. UW supports US policy with few resources, low casualty risk, and negates anti-access capabilities of hostile states. The joint definition for UW is: “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area.”6 

UW supports opposition groups to a state government or occupying power. US objectives range from the coercion of a hostile state, disruption of that state’s activities, or complete overthrow of its government. In UW, the US uses a surrogate to pursue its objectives, which is an indirect approach versus the direct application of US military power. Additionally, UW is conducted in a denied area, which is an area unsuitable for a conventional US campaign due to geographic, military, economic, or political factors. 

The five pillars of irregular warfare (IW) consist of: UW, foreign internal defense (FID), stability operations (STABOPS), counterterrorism (CT), and counterinsurgency (COIN).7 Irregular threats associated with IW activities normally occur simultaneously within the same region. Consequently, a UW campaign must also consider the relationships and activities of allied, neutral, and hostile countries while providing regional stability and addressing irregular threats within nation states. 

Remainder of the article can be downloaded in PDF from here:

http://www.alsa.mil/library/alsb/ALSB%202013-1.pdf

Here is the link to the entire Air Land Sea Bulletin:

http://www.alsa.mil/library/alsb/ALSB%202013-1.pdf

CONTENTS 

Director’s Comments .........................................................3 

FEATURE ARTICLES 

Joint Doctrine for Unconventional Warfare ....................4 

Articulating the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Biometrics Operating Model in the United States (US) Africa Command Area of Responsibility ......................................................................................8 

Integrating Conventional Aviation with Special Operations Forces (SOF) is like Running a Marathon at a Sprint Pace .........................................................................14 

Unity of Command Should Guide 

SOF and GPF Integration ................................................18 

Integrating Village Stability Operations into a Conventional Force Battlespace ................................................…

Unveiling the 2012 Army Capstone Concept

Unveiling the 2012 Army Capstone Concept

by Robert M. Toguchi

Journal Article | December 14, 2012 - 4:30am

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/unveiling-the-2012-army-capstone-concept

Why Concepts Matter?

Strategic pitfalls are commonplace in warfare.  History is with replete with former armies that prepared for the wrong type of conflict and received the unflattering result of becoming failed military systems.  The Prussian Army of 1806, the Russian Army of 1914, and the French Army of 1940, are just a few of the well-known examples that did not escape the outcome of strategic failure.  When war came, they ceased to exist.  Whether a disparity in tactical weaponry was unveiled, absence of proper training or doctrine was prevalent, or a lack of decisive leadership persisted; the strategic outcome of pitting well-prepared forces against deficient military organizations have been catastrophic.  With this realization, the U.S. Army must continue to invest in the purposeful development of operational concepts to ensure the long term viability of the military system.  This month in December 2012, the Army will publish a new version of the Army Capstone Concept.  To support this effort, this article will provide insights on the value of operational concepts, dangers associated with flawed concepts, and the key ideas within the Army Capstone Concept to guide developments and activities for the next several years.

The Role of Concepts

Since the U.S. military today is in a period of transition, concepts can help the U.S. Army identify the next big idea or key trend in the conduct of warfare.  What is different?  The global international security environment is in the midst of fundamental change.  The U.S. economic downturn which began in 2008 continues today and has created security implications for competing military systems around the globe.  The economic environment will likely have a lasting impact on investments in military modernization and transformation – not just for the U.S. and its allies and partners, but for competitors and adversaries as well.  Not only will friendly militaries be shrinking in size, but they will experience a growing gap between their capabilities and those of U.S. forces as their research and development budgets shrink along with their ability to modernize equipment and facilities.  The resulting lack of interoperability will present a greater challenge for the U.S. to build military partnerships and coalitions.  The effect on potential adversaries may not be as severe.  As adversaries are able to focus investment and procurement of specific capabilities to address or avoid U.S. military overmatch, the potential for an increasingly level technological playing field will increase over time.  Concepts help to prepare the Army for today’s and tomorrow’s transitions.

(Continued at the link below)

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/unveiling-the-2012-army-capstone-concept

Malaysia: Victim of America’s “Irregular Warfare” Ops?

Another example of how open source information can be interpreted and exploited.  This author (who is an American according to his bio below) obviously thinks that the US, and some of the organizations outlined below, is a threat to Malaysia. I think this is a very interesting interpretation of US Unconventional Warfare doctrine by the author:

Just as described in Phase 1, “external sponsors conduct psychological preparation to unify population against established government,” it can be gathered that this first step has already been attempted. Bersih coalition leader Ambiga Sreenevasan has long admitted that her organization receives financial assistance from “external sponsors,” namely, the US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) and Open Society Institute (OSI). 

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) also annually provides $100,000 (RM 317,260) to political news website Malaysiakini, widely considered to be the nation’s most pro-opposition news outlet. Premesh Chandran, Malaysiakini CEO, is a grantee of the  Open Society Foundations and launched the news organization with a $100,000 grant from the Soros-funded Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA). NED also provides $90,000 (RM 285,516) to SUARAM. [6] Knowingly, or unknowingly, these organizations have received financial support from the US Embassy due to the controversial political discourse they espouse. Of course, the expression of dissent should never be denied, and although the Najib Razak administration has begun to move away from Mahathir’s administrative model by relaxing controls on expression, many still feel more can be done. 

If the United States is pursuing the kind of policy described in the Unconventional Warfare manual, one can understand how foreign-funded rights advocacy groups may be perceived as threatening to Malaysian authorities, regardless of the politics and values they preach. Ostensibly, Malaysian authorities are concerned about the violence and insurrectionary behavior that have accompanied foreign-funded political movements in other countries once momentum built around them. Malaysia would not likely fall victim to an insurgency campaign anywhere near the scale seen in Syria. However, it would be unwise to dismiss the possibility of seeing the kind of violence that took shape in Thailand during the political unrest of 2010 if foreign elements continue to pursue “irregular warfare.” The possibility of political instability coming to fruition during the general election period may factor into explaining why the current government has not yet declared them.

V/R

Dave

Malaysia: Victim of America’s “Irregular Warfare” Ops?

http://www.globalresearch.ca/malaysia-victim-of-americas-irregular-warfare-ops/5312600

By Nile Bowie

Global Research, December 01, 2012

Region: Asia

Theme: Intelligence

The issue of civil society groups receiving foreign funding has been a major point of discussion in Malaysia during recent times, causing controversy and drawing criticism from activists to members of Parliament alike.

Some activists tend to view Putrajaya’s investigation into rights advocacy groups like SUARAM (a noted recipient of foreign funding) as a desperate attempt to stifle dissent and attack civil society. Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has repeatedly warned of a foreign-funded destabilization campaign aimed at regime change in Malaysia – a claim that has been generally dismissed by Bersih goers and the like.

With the nation’s 13th General Election looming, some see talk of “foreign plots” as tired rhetoric, while others fail to grasp the deeper machinations of foreign influence and do little more than finger pointing at political opponents. In this instance, the pages of a leaked US military document provide valuable insight into the nature of “foreign plots” potentially aimed against Malaysia.

 “TC 18-01 SPECIAL FORCES UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE” is listed on the US Army’s official website and can only be accessed by authorized officials within the American government (a leaked copy has been made available and can be viewed by clicking here). [1] The document is significant because it provides a step-by-step definition of Washington’s “irregular warfare” and unconventional warfare tactics. The manual illustrates the sheer impunity with which the United States conducts its foreign policy, aimed at illegally interfering into the political affairs of foreign nations with an aim to destabilize and reorder them to further American economic interests; Dr. Christof Lehmann describes the manual as:

 “…a step by step guide of how to create, manipulate, co-opt and make use of a countries population, persons of special interest inside the country as well as expatriates, organizations inside as well as outside the country, towards a subversion. Beginning with manipulating dissent into demonstrations, the polarization of a population, riots and armed insurgencies that require action by security forces, and psychological warfare by means of media, step by step, in logical sequence, towards a full scale war, based on humanitarian principles and the pretext of bringing democracy and freedom.” [2]

The targets of the above mentioned irregular warfare operations are those states that have been unwilling to align themselves with American diplomatic and economic interests or semi-compliant states that are strategically located and abundant in natural resources.

The manual describes meticulously orchestrated covert operations that are conducted in phases; beginning with psychologically influencing the target population through foreign-funded dissident news media organizations. Subsequently, targeted nations are infiltrated to provide training and equipment to dissident groups, until a political transition is imposed, by force if necessary.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.globalresearch.ca/malaysia-victim-of-americas-irregular-warfare-ops/5312600