Excerpts:
The Asia security system is to be constructed atop the foundations of the US hub-and-spokes of alliances in Asia—the San Francisco system, which is enjoying a burst of health and regional affection in its seventh decade.The longevity of the US alliance system is a tribute to its ability to change colour and form according to the needs of the Asian ally. Similarly, the US military guarantee to Asia has vitality and endurance because it has a chameleon capacity—adjusting colour, weight and contours to suit different Asian partners.
Conclusion:
V/RThe adaptability of the US military guarantee makes it easier for the concert to rise on Asia’s existing foundations and not attempt the far more difficult task of displacing or replacing the US system.
Dave
Asia Essentials: the US military chameleon
9Sep 2013
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The Asia security system is to be constructed atop the foundations of the US hub-and-spokes of alliances in Asia—the San Francisco system, which is enjoying a burst of health and regional affection in its seventh decade.
The longevity of the US alliance system is a tribute to its ability to change colour and form according to the needs of the Asian ally. Similarly, the US military guarantee to Asia has vitality and endurance because it has a chameleon capacity—adjusting colour, weight and contours to suit different Asian partners.
Envisage the US alliance system as three layers. The top layer holds the formal alliances expressed by treaty. Below the formal layer sits the de facto or virtual alliances. And in the lowest layer sit the partial or quasi-military relationships. In this lowest level are the partnerships or relationships, but it’s no stretch to call them quasi alliances. This is the beauty of the US military chameleon, adapting as it shifts through the different layers and colours. If the champion chameleon is one that can merge while walking across a kilt, then the US military can just about do tartan.
Along with its formal treaties, the US has slowly developed informal alliances to add in these other layers. Singapore is an obvious example of a de facto ally—so true blue it’s edging towards the top layer. The one-way US pledge to Taiwan, enshrined in US law, means it reaches beyond the virtual category towards formal status—but for obvious reasons it has to stay in the de facto category. New Zealand has shifted between all three categories, but it’s now back to near the top of the de facto class.
The lowest layer of the system – and in many ways the most fascinating—is where the quasi allies dwell, based on the half or partial nature of the relationship and the fluctuating level of commitment. Malaysia has sat there for decades, but is being joined by others now more willing to accept the US embrace, such as Vietnam and Indonesia. India has emerged quickly as one of the most important quasi allies. The speed with which India moves towards de facto status will tell much about Asia’s strategic temperature.
The chameleon nature of all this is expressed by how US military approaches have evolved since the act of creation in San Francisco. In 1951, the San Francisco system was both the formal resolution of WW2 in Asia, but also a reflection of what had happened in the six years since the end of the war: the division of Europe, the Cold War, the communist victory in China and, crucially, the Korean War.
The US needed Japan as an ally and—at that point the one developed economy in Asia—to start firing on all cylinders. To get Japan as an ally, Washington had to reassure the rest of non-communist Asia: thus the chain of treaties that stretches from Hokkaido to Hobart.
(Continued at the link below)
