Today John Collins spoke to graduate students in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. The topic was National Security Career Choices. Below are some links to the text of his talk as well as some other valuable documents he provided for students and national security practitioners alike.
1. Text: National Security Career Choices: https://db.tt/07kfd3kY
2. Advice for writing and publishing: Sharp Pens Sharpened Swords: https://db.tt/TK2rVw8S
3. The A-B-C's of Military Intervention: A checklist of Key Considerations: https://db.tt/NHMF1TVp
4. US Special Operations: Personal Opinions: https://db.tt/87rZ2Ue3
5. Original Five SOF Truths: https://db.tt/aQVmdDiJ
As soon as we have the podcast complete we will post it on the Georgetown Center for Security Studies web site and I will provide the link.
A short summary of his biography:
John Collins enlisted as an Army private, May 1942 and retired as a colonel, May 1972. He served as a IX Air Force aircraft controller in Europe during World War II; arrived in Korea only a few days before that war ended; and was Chief of General Westmoreland's Campaign Planning Group in Vietnam. His culminating assignment was at the National War College as Director of Military Strategy Studies, 1968-71 and as Chief, Strategic Research Group, 1971-72. Awards for 30 years of active and reserve Army service included two Legions of Merit, a Bronze Star, and a Master Parachutist Badge.
Following his Army career, Colonel Collins worked in the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from June 1972 until January 1996 as a Senior Specialist in National Defense. Upon his retirement, he was awarded the Award for Distinguished Service to the Congress of the United States. In September 2003, he received a Public Service Award from the Secretary of the Army for his contributions to public understanding of national security affairs in general and of the Army in particular.
In addition to Colonel Collins' extensive output under the aegis of CRS, he is the author of numerous additional publications, including Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (1973), U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique (1982), Green Berets, SEALs, and Spetsnaz (1987), America's Small Wars (1991), and Military Geography (1998). His memoirs, From Nowhere to Somewhere, were published by Vanity Press in 2012.
Colonel Collins is the founder and operator of the Warlord Loop, a by-invitation-only email forum whose influential members have covered the full national security spectrum and engaged in voluminous, freewheeling, unclassified exchanges since 1998.
Showing posts with label intervention. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intervention. Show all posts
Thursday, March 20, 2014
Monday, September 9, 2013
Strike to degrade Syrian forces would still be limited (and a new metaphor)
Just had to share this new metaphor:
A second senior official, who has seen the most recent planning, offered this metaphor to describe such a strike: If Assad is eating Cheerios, we're going to take away his spoon and give him a fork. Will that degrade his ability to eat Cheerios? Yes. Will it deter him? Maybe. But he'll still be able to eat Cheerios.
Strike to degrade Syrian forces would still be limited
Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY7:06 a.m. EDT September 8, 2013
The attack would involve launches of missiles solely from ships, according to the two senior officers familiar with the planning.
(Photo: Jonathan Sunderman, AP)
STORY HIGHLIGHTS
- Mission compared to making Assad eat cereal with a fork instead of a spoon
- No Air Force assets included in the mission planning
- "Degrading" Syria's military is a term of art, not a science
WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel's choice of the term "degrade" to describe an attack on Syria has been interpreted by Pentagon planners as guidance for a limited strike, according to senior military officials.
The weapon of choice is the Tomahawk cruise missile aboard four Navy destroyers in the eastern Mediterranean. Though powerful, the missiles alone would likely not be capable of crippling Bashar Assad's regime, which is accused of using chemical weapons. The targets selected for attack are meant to punish Assad, not swing the tide in favor of rebels seeking his ouster, said a senior officer familiar with the planning.
That officer, another officer with experience in the Middle East and two senior defense officials with knowledge of the planning told USA TODAY the type of weapons that would be used and the type of targets that would be hit. All spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about the planning.
The attack would involve launches of missiles solely from ships, according to the two senior officers familiar with the planning. The Air Force can fire missiles from outside Syrian air space but are not expected to take part in the mission, the officers said.
"Degrade" is not a military textbook term, the four officers and officials said. In other words, it is open to interpretation.
Pentagon press secretary George Little said repeatedly in a briefing Thursday that an attack on Syria would not require U.S. ground troops, or "boots on the ground." The mission would be limited to deterring and degrading Assad's ability to use chemical weapons.
The strike would be limited in scope and duration, Little said. The security of chemical weapons stockpiles is being taken into account by the Pentagon.
The strike, as envisioned, would be limited in the number of targets and done within a day or two. It could be completed in one fell swoop with missiles, said one senior official familiar with the weapons involved. A smaller, follow-on strike could be launched if targets aren't sufficiently damaged.
(Continued at the link below)
Monday, September 2, 2013
U.S. intervention in Syria: War for virtue
Quite a critique of America and Americans:
The United States doesn’t fight for land, resources, hatred, revenge, tribute, religious conversion — the usual stuff. Along with the occasional barrel of oil, we fight for virtue.
And yet Americans still believe in the idea of the good and virtuous war. It scratches our Calvinist itch; it proves our election to blessedness.…
Oscar Wilde said: “As long as war is regarded as wicked, it will always have its fascination. When it is looked upon as vulgar, it will cease to be popular.” He didn’t foresee a United States that would regard war as virtuous.
Do we really regard war as virtuous? Do we have a Calvanist itch?
But I am also reminded of this quote:
V/RVirtue is a state of war, and to live in it we have always to combat with ourselves.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Dave
U.S. intervention in Syria: War for virtue
By Henry Allen, Published: September 1
Henry Allen, who won the Pulitzer Prize for criticism in 2000, was a Post editor and reporter for 39 years.
Where were the smiles, the flowers? We’d expected, in a modest way, to be greeted as liberators.
This was many years ago, Chu Lai, South Vietnam, 1966, in one of the early disasters of the United States’ post-World War II attempts to fight wars for virtue. People in the villages refused to meet our eyes, and they only smiled if they were selling us something.
How disappointing. The war was young then, and so were we, but not so young that we hadn’t seen newsreel footage of the cheers from the giddy urchins of Naples, the French doing their tiptoe waves.
But not the Vietnamese. It seemed that in Chu Lai, at least, the beneficiaries of our liberation and largesse hated us, or were too scared to show they liked us.
But why? Weren’t we fighting a war of liberation, another good war in the American tradition of good wars? Wasn’t my Marine civic action team giving candy to children, the same SweeTarts you could buy in American movie theaters?
The giveaway lasted two days.
“SweeTart numbah ten!” shouted the kids who swarmed our truck on the second day. “Numbah ten” meant the worst. They flung the SweeTarts back at us. We flung them back at them, no doubt losing a heart here, a mind there. The Battle of the SweeTarts. At the end of the day you’d have to say we lost it, another case of American virtue unrewarded.
The good war, the virtuous war. We believe in it. We have to believe in it or we wouldn’t be Americans.
As John Updike wrote: “America is beyond power, it acts as in a dream, as a face of God. Wherever America is, there is freedom, and wherever America is not, madness rules with chains, darkness strangles millions. Beneath her patient bombers, paradise is possible.”
The United States doesn’t fight for land, resources, hatred, revenge, tribute, religious conversion — the usual stuff. Along with the occasional barrel of oil, we fight for virtue.
Never mind that it doesn’t work out — the Gulf of Tonkin lies, Agent Orange, waterboarding, nonexis
Just so. We talk about our warmaking as if it were a therapeutic science — surgical strikes, precision bombing, graduated responses, a homeopathic treatment that uses war to cure us of war. “Like cures like,” as the homeopathic slogan has it; “the war to end all wars” as Woodrow Wilson is believed to have said of World War I. We send out our patient bombers in the manner of piling on blankets to break a child’s fever. We launch our missiles and say: “We’re doing it for your own good.”
After World War II, I was taught in school that humankind, especially Americans, hate war and love peace. The United Nations rose on New York’s East River, a foundry beating swords into plowshares. We renamed the Department of War as the Department of Defense. We had Atoms for Peace, CARE packages, UNICEF boxes at Halloween and the Berlin Airlift instead of a war against the Soviet Union.
The problem here is that humankind doesn’t hate war, it loves war. That’s why it fights so many of them. The New England Indians were so devoted to fighting each other that they couldn’t unite to drive the European settlers into the sea in King Philip’s War.
What better explains all of recorded history with its atrocity, conquest, pillage and extermination? Our love of war is the problem. War is an addiction, maybe a disease, the chronic autoimmune disease of humanity. It erupts, it subsides, but it’s always there, waiting to cripple and kill us. The best we can do is hope to keep it in remission.
And yet Americans still believe in the idea of the good and virtuous war. It scratches our Calvinist itch; it proves our election to blessedness.
(Continued at the link below)
Wednesday, August 28, 2013
THINGS TO REMEMBER BEFORE GOING TO WAR IN SYRIA
Ryan Evans provides wise counsel. I think rereading John Collins' 1995 essay is timely. I have pasted it below for ease of access.
V/R
Dave
THINGS TO REMEMBER BEFORE GOING TO WAR IN SYRIA
August 26, 2013 · in Hasty Ambush
“No one starts a war -or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”
-Carl von Clausewitz, On War
President Obama has cried “Havoc!” over the use of chemical weapons in Syria. With warships dispatched to the Eastern Mediterranean, has he also let slip the dogs of war?
I have pushed Colonel John Collins’ “Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations” before and now I do so again. Before we involve ourselves in yet another Middle Eastern conflict, I hope the President and his national security team are prepared to answer these questions and more.
Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations
JOHN M. COLLINS
Circumstances under which the United States should intervene militarily on behalf of threatened US interests overseas became the subject of intense debate in 1984, when Secretary of Defense Weinberger prescribed six preconditions that received mixed reviews.[1] Disputes within and between the executive and legislative branches have intensified since post-Cold War complexities replaced the US-Soviet confrontation.[2] Criteria for employing US armed forces as foreign policy instruments are still in flux.[3] It is possible to identify considerations that might help US leaders determine whether military power is appropriate in any given instance, including cases that are benign to begin with. Insights in seven categories familiar to strategists--national interests, threats, political-military objectives, policy guidance, planning options, resources, and public opinion--could help underpin decisions to intervene or abstain and to ascertain whether ongoing military operations seem warranted. Policymakers must determine which interests are worth a fight, relationships between political objectives and the means to attain them, and alternatives in the event that preferred options fail.
Key Considerations
Whether, where, when, and how to intervene militarily pose problems that call for subjective judgments. Secretary Weinberger prescribed "six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of US combat forces abroad": the presence of "vital" US or allied interests; clear intent to win; precise objectives and ways to accomplish them; "reasonable" assurance of public support; military action as a last resort; continual reassessment and adjustments as events unfold. The considerations identified below, unlike Weinberger's preconditions, recognize that there are no immutable and universally applicable rules for decisions about interventions. Each case is unique. The following checklists therefore pose questions rather than answers.
National Interests
Military intervention in the absence of highly valued interests often is difficult to justify. Interests that directly affect US national security normally take precedence over all others. The only vital interest is national survival with sovereignty, territorial integrity, fundamental institutions, and values acceptably intact. Other valid interests, including traditional life styles and concerns for international order, are worth preserving. The advisability of military action is most evident when practical political or economic interests are strong. International interests in petroleum, for example, helped create a potent coalition after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, whereas mainly humanitarian motives thus far have failed to solidify unilateral US or multilateral support for military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Intangible interests nevertheless may sometimes prove compelling. National credibility, a necessary asset for any nation that wants to lead, is among them.
A checklist that connects national interests with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
- Which US and allied interests are pertinent? Are they compatible?
- Which of them are worth spending US lives for?
- What is their order of precedence?
Threats to National Interests
Threats to valued national interests vary with regard to imminence and intensity. Decisionmakers who hope to avoid wrong wars at wrong times with wrong enemies cannot rationally conclude that military initiatives would be best until they consider alternatives, appraise probable risks, and prioritize each threat. Those processes first demand intelligence estimates that evaluate enemy capabilities, limitations, and potential responses to US options, supplemented by net assessments that dispassionately compare friendly and enemy postures, with particular attention to geographical contexts.
A checklist that connects threats with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
- Which perceived threats menace US national interests most severely?
- Which of those threats are susceptible to mainly military solutions?
- How do enemy cultures, capabilities, and geography affect the ability of the United States and its allies or prospective coalition partners to counter threats militarily?
- What might be the long-term consequences of an opponent's success?
Political Aims and Military Missions
Political aims and military missions prescribe for US armed forces what must be done to safeguard national interests against perceived threats. Like interests, they should be prioritized to allow the application of resources for the most important purposes. Explicit statements are commendable, because unrealistic tasks and speculative requirements otherwise result. Political aims and military missions are best developed in collaboration to ensure compatibility; the US experience in Vietnam, for example, was adversely influenced by senior commanders and their civilian superiors who pursued incompatible outcomes. While it is a truism that no plan survives contact, decisionmakers must nevertheless guard against so-called "mission creep," which incrementally (sometimes inadvertently) amplifies ends well beyond the original intent of a plan and hence the ways and means available to attain them. Humanitarian purposes, for example, initially inspired US operations in Somalia; the subsequent switch to peacemaking and nation development opened a gulf between goals and deployed capabilities. Disputes among the United States, the United Nations, NATO, and other allies can be dangerously disruptive if unresolved, as in Bosnia where some prefer peacekeeping while others believe peace enforcement should be the main goal.
Desirable objectives seek a better situation than prevailed before US armed forces intervened. Military victory is only one satisfactory end, despite General MacArthur's admonition that there is no substitute for it. As defined in this article, success is attained if the United States achieves sound objectives in acceptable time at acceptable costs.
A checklist that connects political aims and military missions with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
- Are political aims clearly expressed and militarily attainable?
- Are the aims of the United States, the UN, and allied or coalition partners harmonious?
- Are political objectives and military missions mutually supportive and reinforcing?
- Would attainment of US aims alleviate the most serious problems in the afflicted state or region?
- What political-military and economic costs would accompany failure?
Strategic and Policy Guidance
Strategic and policy guidance, including military rules of engagement, can simplify or complicate the preparation of plans and the attainment of objectives. US policymakers were relatively unconcerned about damage and enemy casualties during World War II, because unconditional surrender was the goal in a "total war" and our principal allies were fighting for survival. US leaders, in sharp contrast, imposed strict restrictions on military operations throughout the Cold War to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union. Manchuria remained a "privileged sanctuary" while combat raged in Korea. President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara personally directed US naval blockades during the Cuban missile crisis. Restraints tightened to prevent a wider war after US forces intervened massively in Vietnam. Sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia were long off limits to US forces; President Johnson picked many targets; graduated responses seemed to apply military power grudgingly. US policymakers, most prominently since Desert Storm, have been reluctant to engage in any armed conflict that promises to be protracted, cause even a few US casualties, or endanger noncombatants. They are prone to consider force only as a last resort, although early decisive action occasionally might quell incipient crises before they become intractable.
A checklist that connects strategic and policy guidance with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
- Are policies compatible with political aims and military missions?
- Could some policy restrictions be safely relaxed?
- Should a time limit be placed on military operations?
- What costs are acceptable in terms of resources and casualties?
Planning Options
US national security planners balance interests and capabilities against risks and costs, taking policy guidance into account, as they search for feasible, suitable, flexible, and politically acceptable solutions to intervention problems. They advise decisionmakers about the relative roles that diplomacy and military power should play, which missions US armed forces might most appropriately perform, and which might better be left to allies. DOD routinely prepares contingency plans to avoid injurious surprise if crises erupt on short notice, but since precise circumstances are unpredictable, planners cannot anticipate every eventuality. Prior planning nevertheless enables senior officials to reach sound broad conclusions about military intervention much sooner than starting from scratch.
Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, in his treatise entitled Military Strategy, identified "planning for certitude as the greatest of all military mistakes."[4] Judicious planners consequently ask themselves "What if this or that happens?" and carefully consider alternative courses of action even when response times are short, then devise substitute Options B, C, and D for implementation if preferred Option A is precluded or fails to produce expected results. One school of thought contends that no action at all is preferable to interventions that risk failure, because accompanying costs would be too high. George Shultz, when he was Secretary of State, spoke for a second school whose members believe that appeasement may invite aggression; that the United States is morally obligated to assist allies with whom it has security commitments; and that it "must bear responsibility for the consequences of its inaction. . . . We cannot opt out of every contest," he continued. "If we do, the world's future will be determined by others--most likely by those who are . . . most hostile to our deeply held principles."[5]
A checklist that connects planning options with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
- How might adversaries react to any given option advanced by the United States and its allies or coalition partners?
- How could US, allied, or coalition forces best share the burdens of an intervention?
- What alternatives appear most attractive if preferred options fail?
- What political and economic price may be incurred for inaction?
Resources
Competition for scarce resources always is fierce, but the best laid plans are useful only if ends (specified as desired outcomes) and means (forces and funds) match reasonably well, with enough in reserve to cope if other current threats loom large. Shortfalls create risks. Reconciliations are required whenever the military balance becomes so unfavorable that important US interests appear vulnerable, objectives appear unrealistic, and commanders anticipate excessively high casualties. Improvements then await decisions to reduce ambitions, add assets, or both.
Repeated operations not directly related to US security, though of value, may expend so much of our operations and maintenance (O&M) funds that little is left to invest in future readiness. The choice then is to cut commitments, increase resources, or both. Multilateral participation might be imperative, although allies and coalitions often impose constraints and require a political or economic quid pro quo.
A checklist that connects resources with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
- Are allocated resources ample for the current contingency?
- Could remaining resources handle other likely crises?
- How many reserve component forces of what kinds would be needed?
- How could allies or coalition partners contribute? Should they? Would they?
Congressional and Public Support
The extent of popular and congressional support ideally should be clear before we undertake a military intervention, but that may not always be the case. Circumstances could force action before approval can be determined; approval also could prove to be transitory. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 10 August 1964, which endorsed intervention in Vietnam, received only two dissenting votes in Congress, but enthusiasm faded fast after the Tet offensive in 1968. The task of statesmanship therefore is to develop and sustain support for foreign policy initiatives that will involve armed intervention. Compelling interests, sensible objectives, and reasonable prospects for success usually are required to sustain the opinion of the American people and US allies.
The news media exerts a powerful influence on US and world opinion by deciding which crises to publicize and which to ignore. Real-time pictures of starving Somali children, for example, helped spur decisions to intervene, while famine in inaccessible Sudan still receives scant notice.
A checklist that connects public opinion with military intervention might typically include the following entries:
- Has the President clearly explained the purposes of intervention?
- Did prior consultation indicate congressional approval?
- Are US interests and objectives sufficiently compelling to attract and retain public support?
- Has media coverage overemphasized the crisis concerned?
- How important is public support to our likely adversaries? Are they better able to develop and sustain it than the United States and US allies?
Reappraisals
Military intervention operations, no matter how innocuously they begin, may eventually make US soldiers, Marines, sailors, and airmen lay their lives on the line. The President, Congress, and their advisers therefore would be wise to repeatedly scrutinize pertinent national interests, threats, objectives, policies, plans, resources, public opinion, and priorities before and after military intervention begins to ascertain whether corrective actions are required. A composite checklist comparable in function to those in this article could assist such assessments.
NOTES
1. Media response to Weinberger's "tests" is available in Secretary Weinberger's National Press Club Speech, Washington, Current News Special Edition No. 1244, DOD, 8 January 1985. That speech plus nine other official views are reproduced in Stephen Daggett and Nina Serafino, The Use of Force: Key Contemporary Documents, Rpt. Nr. 94-805F, Washington, Congressional Research Service, 17 October 1994.
2. For some contemporary points and counterpoints, see US Congress, House Rept. 104-18, Parts 1, 2, 3, National Security Revitalization Act, Report Together With Additional and Dissenting Views, 104th Congress, 1st Session, 6 February 1995, 166 p.; Ann Devroy, "President, Dole Divide Over Foreign Policy," The Washington Post, 2 March 1995, p. 1; Senator Bob Dole, "Shaping America's Global Future," Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring 1995), 29-43.
3. Past practices are summarized by Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert L. Goldich in Use of Force by the United States: Case Studies, 1950-1991, Rpt. Nr. 92-757, Washington, Congressional Research Service, 14 October 1992. Stanley R. Sloan analyzes present trends in The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence?, CRS Rpt. Nr. 94-581S, 20 July 1994.
4. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1967), p. 85.
5. "Shultz vs. Weinberger--When to Use Power," U.S. News & World Report, 24 December 1984, pp. 20-21.
John M. Collins is the Senior Specialist in National Defense with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. He enlisted in the Army as a private in 1942 and retired with the rank of colonel in 1972. He is a graduate of the University of Kansas City and holds a master's degree from Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts. He is also a graduate of the Army Command General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the National War College. He was chief of the Campaign Planning Group, Vietnam, in 1967-68. He is the author of ten books, including Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Naval Institute Press, 1973), and many major Library of Congress publications.
Reviewed 25 November 1996. Please send comments or corrections to usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.
Thursday, January 31, 2013
Obama administration learns that ‘leading from behind’ is the right place for the U.S.
I wish whomever coined the term of "leading from behind" had not done so. It does much damage to the concept of helping friends, partners, and allies to conduct their fight against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism. Why are there those that want to automatically default to the US having to take the lead? But "leading from behind" may go down in history as one of the more damage foreign policy phrases. I know some smart guy in the administration thought it up and it sounded good for a minute and even may have looked good on a power point chart but it has damaged the ability to be flexible in foreign policy and security strategy because of partisan attacks on the use of the phrase. Does anyone argue that sometimes it is not better to help friends, partners and allies in their fights or do we think we must always be in the lead and (try to) solve every problem in the world with US military power?
V/R
Dave
Obama administration learns that ‘leading from behind’ is the right place for the U.S.
By Walter Pincus, Published: January 30
If Mali is any example, “leading from behind” is the right policy choice for the United States to follow in most of today’s international confrontations with what is now termed “terrorism.”
The Obama administration’s actions in the past months reflect it has learned some hard lessons from the United States’ 11 years fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. The wars have cost the nation 6,300 U.S. lives, 50,300 casualties among American service personnel and about $1.3 trillion.
What’s one lesson?
“The best-intentioned foreign intervention is bound to bog its armies down in endless wars fighting invisible enemies to help ungrateful locals,” as the Economist magazine frankly wrote in its Jan. 26 issue.
Sound familiar?
How about what then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told West Point cadets almost two years ago: “Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General [Douglas] MacArthur so delicately put it.”
On Tuesday night, former secretary of state George P. Shultz, in an appearance before the Council on Foreign Relations here in Washington, put it this way: “Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be the template for how we go about” dealing with threats of terrorism.
The Obama refinement to such intervention may be to provide intelligence and logistic support to those deserving such help and capable of receiving it. But the lead for using combat troops, “boots on the ground,” should be taken by those whose vital interests are directly involved — starting with the host government. Next should be neighboring countries. In the best of circumstances, they would be banded together in regional organizations, and, if possible, with authorization from the United Nations.
If the situation requires U.S. diplomacy to facilitate such collaboration and authority, fine. That is where the world’s greatest power should take the lead. If more hawkish Americans want to call this “leading from behind,” then that’s all right, too. Finally, when outside ground forces from a major power are required, it should come from a nation with historic roots in the host country.
France is a good example. It stepped up and took the lead by going into Mali, a former colony, in response to the Bamako government’s call for help. Another example is the international cooperation on the oceans off Somalia that has successfully been dealing with the piracy problem.
(Continued at the lin below)
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