Showing posts with label Zenpundit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Zenpundit. Show all posts

Monday, November 24, 2014

WarCouncil’s “Zero to Clausewitz”

Thanks to Zenpundit.

A good cheat sheet for terms of strategy.


This is testable. :-)


WarCouncil’s “Zero to Clausewitz”

[by Mark Safranski, a.k.a. “zen“]
The fine gents at WarCouncil.org have released the Cliff Notes of Strategy in their “WarCouncil.org 300 Word Strategic Education” . It is excellent:
Can we educate a strategist in an hour?  Some would argue this task is impossible, that it takes a lifetime, or at least 10,000 hours. 
But what if we had to?  Imagine it were possible – how would you do it?  How would youaccelerate learning to strategic competency?  Note: I define competency as someone that would know, understand, and be able to apply a core set of strategic concepts to analyze and appraise modern war (see also “strategic understanding”).
One scientifically validated path would be the Pareto Principle, which holds, across many systems, that 80% of output comes from 20% of input.  How does this help us rapidly educate strategic practitioners?  We would first identify the critical 20% knowledge base that produces these outsize gains.  We would then leverage this 20% (or “minimum effective dose”) by proving a simple framework for use in any war.

(Continued at Zenpundit's blog at the link below)

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

Zenpundit: Echevarria and the Irrational in Strategy

I think Mark Safranski at Zenpundit has it all figured out with this single line:

Strategy is rational, but people doing strategy and the circumstances in which strategy is done often are not.

Echevarria and the Irrational in Strategy

Adam Elkus alerted me to an insightful op-ed by Dr. Antulio Echevarria of SSI:
…. Instead, we need to rediscover the value of strategizing relative to the outcome, the product, an individual strategy. The hard truth is that policy does not always need strategy to get what it wants. We have used military force plenty of times in our history without the guiding logic of strategy, and—though critics do not like to admit it—we have made it work often enough for it to be taken seriously. Sometimes what policy wants most is not to be tied to something inflexible, particularly something as inflexible as our strategic process. It is the proverbial machine that goes of itself, and it takes, or almost does, the preparation for and direction of war out of policy’s hands. The question modern-day Clausewitzians really have to answer is whether war has its own logic after all, a logic provided by the dictates, the processes, and the dynamics of making strategy.
      In all the online debates and blog sites concerning strategy, one theme is constant: we call strategy an art, but approach it as a science. We praise creative thinking, but assess our strategies with formulae: strategy = ends + ways + means (the ends we want to achieve + the ways or concepts + the availablemeans). This formula is as recognizable to modern strategists as Einstein’s equation E=mc2 is to physicists. Each defines its respective field. Like all good math, good strategies consist of balanced equations. As our variables change, we merely rebalance our strategy: scale down the ends, increase the means, or introduce new ways. Like any good equation, our strategy remains valid so long as we keep one half equal to the other. This is a far cry from when military strategy meant the “art of the general” and, by extension, grand strategy meant the “art of the head of state.”
.    If the art of strategy is truly lost, perhaps it is because—despite our rhetoric to the contrary—we really wanted it to be a science all along.
Several comments….
.(Continued at the link below)

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