Something to consider from a psychological warfare/psychological operations, propaganda perspective.  Some good words from Crispin Burke.

V/R

Dave

Useful Idiots: How a Facebook Campaign Became Propaganda For Bashar Assad

Posted on 13 Sep 2013 by Starbuck

http://wingsoveriraq.com/2013/09/13/useful-idiots-how-a-facebook-campaign-became-propaganda-for-bashar-assad/

Syria is a proverbial Gordian Knot; the two-year old conflict is a vexing web of proxy armies, tenuous allies, and a myriad of factions with competing goals.

But just as the real conflict has been a lightning rod for all manner of hidden agendas, so has the domestic debate been here in the United States.  According to polls, the country remains deeply divided over the prospect of air and missile strikes on Syria.

Of course, war is the most serious undertaking of any state, and should only be embarked upon after great deliberation.  After all, debate is healthy in a democracy.

Still, partisan rancor often trumps careful analysis.  Nowhere was this more true than on the 43,000-strong Facebook page for the “Armed Forces Tea Party“, in which purported service members–in full uniform–masked their faces with signs protesting involvement in Syria.

Not only was this an egregious transgression in civil-military relations (Psst, here’s somegreat reading), but the campaign played directly into the Assad regime’s propaganda, as hackers from the Syrian Electronic Army defaced the US Marine Corps’ website with the aforementioned images, urging the United States not to interfere in Syria.

For decades, the Communist Party wooed influential Westerners into showing sympathy for their causes.  Dozens of authors, actors, and celebrities have, intentionally or not, lent legitimacy to all manner of dictators.  Such activity isn’t limited to the Cold War, either, as we’ve recently seen with basketball star Dennis Rodman’s overtures towards North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-un, whom  he refers to as “my friend”.

During the Cold War, misguided elites were referred to as “useful idiots“; and whether through vanity or naiveté, they advanced the interests of some very unsavory characters.

(Continued at the link below)

http://wingsoveriraq.com/2013/09/13/useful-idiots-how-a-facebook-campaign-became-propaganda-for-bashar-assad/

Afghanistan Order of Battle from the Institute for the Study of War

Just in case anyone wants to know the Order of Battle for Afghanistan the Institute for the Study of War http://www.understandingwar.org/)  has graciously provided the attached document of the partial order of battle  at the web site below.  Note the caveats in the excerpted paragraph. It is fascinating to scroll through the names of the unit commanders.  Also the 108 footnotes are interesting.  Note information derived even from unit FaceBook pages.  Excellent example of what is available on Social Media and other sources to track this type of information.  As an example I have pasted the first 5 footnotes below.  From an OPSEC perspective we have to learn to operate in the age of global and social media where there is so much transparency.

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AfghanistanOrbat_November2012.pdf

This document describes the composition and placement of U.S. and other Western combat forces in Afghanistan down to battalion level. It includes the following categories of units: maneuver (i.e. infantry, armor, and cavalry) units, which in most cases are responsible for particular districts or provinces; artillery units, including both those acting as provisional maneuver units and those in traditional artillery roles; aviation units, both rotary and fixed-wing; military police units; most types of engineer and explosive ordnance disposal units; and “white” special operations forces, described in general terms. It does not include “black” special operations units or other units such as logistical, transportation, medical, and intelligence units or Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

For researchers and students, the document at this link combines all the orders of battle from October 2012 back to February 2009.

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/afORBATs_combinedOctober2012.pdf

1 Established in the summer of 2012, SOJTF-A/NSOCC-A is a two-star headquarters that oversees all three allied SOF commands in Afghanistan: CJSOTF-A, ISAF SOF, and the “black” special operations forces of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command task force. See USSOCOM Fact Book 2013. 

2 CJSOTF-A is headquartered by troops from the 3rd Special Forces Group. Its core tasks are to advise the Afghan National Army’s special operations forces (the Afghan commando kandaks and Special Forces) and to train and advise the local police forces associated with the Village Stability Operations program. CJSOTF-A  controls six battalion-level task forces: two built around Army Special Forces battalions, two around Army infantry battalions, one around a Marine special operations battalion, and one around a Navy SEAL team. Navy Combat Camera Command Detachment 1210, “CJSOTF-A Presentation,” June 2012.  

3 2-3 Infantry is detached from 3rd SBCT, 2nd ID, and deployed in December 2011. TF Ghazni mixes conventional and special operations troops, and some of 2-3’s companies provide security for special operations forces elsewhere in Afghanistan. See “Winter Letter from the Commander, Patriot 6.” 

4 2-7 Infantry relieved 1-30 Infantry in October 2012. TF Balkh mixes conventional and special operations troops. See battalion Facebook page.  

5 Established in 2007, ISAF SOF is a one-star, brigade-level headquarters that oversees most non-U.S. special operations forces in Afghanistan as well as one U.S. special operations unit, TF 10. Command of ISAF SOF appears to rotate between British and Australian officers; Brig. Mark Smethurst was in command as of March 2012.

V/R

Dave