Wednesday, October 23, 2019

10/23/2019 Korean News and Commentary

Access Here:  https://conta.cc/2pOplmY

1. History, islets and rulings behind tension between South Korea, Japan
2. Sweden to send new invitation for U.S.-N.K. nuke talks within coming weeks: Swedish envoy
3. US wins court seizure of North Korean cargo vessel
4. Political parties mixed about N.K. leader's order to remove Mt. Kumgang facilities
5. Kim sends ultimatum over cross-border project amid stalemate in inter-Korean ties
6. North Korea Trades Rare Earth Mine Rights to China for Investment in Solar Plants
7. North Korea's military sells coal to pay for uniforms
8. Public sector to save North Korean schools: Kim

Tuesday, October 22, 2019

Part 2 10/22/2019 Korean News and Commentary

Access Here: https://conta.cc/35QncYC

1. Why did Cyber Command back off its recent plans to call out North Korean hacking?
2. Kim Jong Un: South Korean facilities in Mt. Kumgang resort must be removed
3.  Deeper inter-Korean economic cooperation necessary to prevent return to confrontation
4. S. Korea becomes largest donor for N. Korea this year
5. N.K. leader criticizes father's policy to depend on S. Korea for Mount Kumgang resort
6. N.K. leader's wife appears in state media after 4-month absence
7. Defectors Send Flyers to N.Korea to Denounce World Cup Qualifier Fiasco
8. N. Korea brings up Yeonpyeong Island to threaten

Part 2 10/22/2019 National Security News and Commentary

Access here: https://conta.cc/33UnoEm

1. Pentagon official overseeing special operations resigns after just 4 months on the job
2. Eight-pound part falls from special ops aircraft and lands at US air base on Okinawa
3. Nerd Revolution: Using Data, Not Bullets, To Defeat ISIS
4. The US is losing the war against tyranny
5. China Sharpens Hacking to Hound Its Minorities, Far and Wide
6. The 2022 Winter Olympics and Beijing’s Uyghur Policy: Sports in the Shadows of Concentration Camps
7. China and US in trillion-dollar tech war
8. U.S. Officials Ignored Trump on Syria and We Are All Paying the Price




10/22/2019 Korean News and Commentary

Access Here: https://conta.cc/33PNQPA


1. For Trump the Dealmaker, Troop Pullouts Without Much in Return
2. South Korea's Moon ups defence spending, urges North to talk
3.  Despite Vow to End ‘Endless Wars,’ Here’s Where About 200,000 Troops Remain
4.  Marines Unable to Conduct Firing Drills on Islands Near N.Korea
5.  6 Russian military aircraft intrude into S. Korea's air defense zone
6.  International sanctions hit North Korea's coal and fishing industries hard 
7. North Korea's coal smuggling continues full speed ahead
8. Seoul City Mulls Making Public Spaces Devoid of Rallies
9. S. Korea decides to give up developing country status in the WTO
10. Trump says 'lot of things going on' regarding North Korea
11.  Trump predicts mysterious ‘major rebuild’ of North Korea
12. DMZ entry control issue up for high-level talks
13. Strange things happen in NK
14. South Korea’s Moon Says Economy Faces ‘Grave’ Situation
15. North Korea Faces an (Under) Population Bomb

10/22/2019 National Security News and Commentary



Access here:  https://conta.cc/35Y7jzh

1.  Despite Vow to End ‘Endless Wars,’ Here’s Where About 200,000 Troops Remain
2. Erdogan’s Ambitions Go Beyond Syria. He Says He Wants Nuclear Weapons.
3. For Trump the Dealmaker, Troop Pullouts Without Much in Return
4.  Pompeo: Trump 'fully prepared' to use military force if necessary
5.  Facebook Discloses New Disinformation Campaigns From Russia and Iran
6. What the US Can Learn From Iranian Warfare
7. Thailand's king strips 'disloyal' royal consort of titles and military ranks
8. A West Point cadet — and a rifle — have been missing since Saturday
9. US Marines Try Using Drones to Bring Blood to Battle
10.  U.S. Withdrawal from Syria Gathers Speed, Amid Accusations of Betrayal



Saturday, August 17, 2019

A National Security Strategy Primer from the National War College

I think this is an excellent reference.  It synthesizes everything I learned at the National War College both as a student and a faculty member.  It is only 84 pages but it really captures the essence of everything you need for a foundation to "do strategy."  This is a very important reference.  I did not know Steven Heffington (though he has a great reputation with tremendous experience) but David Tretler was a fantastic professor and I knew Adam Oler as a student and I am pleased that he has returned to teach at NWC and help produce this excellent reference.

Note also the contributions of the late Colonel John Collins, AKA The Warlord, one of our foremost strategic thinkers over the years, are acknowledged.


EDITED BY
STEVEN HEFFINGTON, ADAM OLER, AND DAVID TRETLER


Purpose
A National Security Strategy Primer provides National War College
(NWC) students with a common point of departure for consideration of
national security strategy and is designed as a principal tool for understanding
and achieving core course learning objectives. The primer
specifically addresses key concepts of national security strategy and outlines
a broad approach for strategy development. Additionally, the primer
serves to set a common national strategy language for use within the
college. To accomplish this task, the primer draws substantially from current
joint and Service-specific doctrine as well as extant Department of
Defense procedures and policy guidance. However, as national strategy is
an inherently multi-instrument, multi-institution endeavor, the primer
draws from interagency language and policy as well as significant literature
on national security strategy found in the doctrine of partner/allied
states, academia, the business sector, and elsewhere. While the primer is
geared toward the NWC core curriculum, it may also serve as a useful
tool for interagency practitioners charged with discussing, designing, or
assessing national security strategies.

Scope
This primer details the elements of strategic logic taught at NWC and
focuses on national security strategy development. For the purposes
of this document, national security strategy is generally considered to
encompass any strategic issue that would fall within the scope of the
National Security Council. While strategic logic is relevant and applicable
to strategy-making in general, the focus herein is not specifically
single-instrument or single-agency strategies but the broader concept of
multi-instrument national security strategy.

Application
The guidance in this primer should help inform and guide a student’s
course of study at the National War College. It should not be taken as
the NWC perspective on the one right answer or the only viable way to
approach strategy. Developing coherent and effective strategy is difficult
due to the complexity and uncertainty inherent in any strategic challenge.
1 Unraveling the complexity and managing the uncertainty requires
an ability to think strategically about the problem at hand. Thinking
strategically entails applying some version of strategic logic. A National
Security Strategy Primer is a restatement of the principal aspects of strategic
logic. Students should be mindful that other useful approaches to
strategy-making at the national security level exist. Some are covered
elsewhere in the NWC curriculum, and others are employed in various
departments and agencies of the executive branch. Yet, as with any discipline,
the study of national security strategy must start somewhere. For
NWC, A National Security Strategy Primer provides the common foundation
from which to build.

Note
This primer is neither official policy nor doctrine. It is the product of a
collaborative effort by members of the NWC faculty, staff, and student
body.2 The primer is one tool among many designed to assist students in
mastering the NWC curriculum.

Sunday, June 30, 2019

Assessment of POTUS-Kim Jong-un meeting at the DMZ/Panmunjom June 30, 2019

My thoughts on the meeting:

Unconventional, experimental, top down diplomacy.  Diplomacy and foreign relations via twitter and social media. Will it pay off?  I hope so but I think it will only work if we understand the true nature of the Kim family regime and we do not take our eye off the ball - north Korea's political warfare strategy and long con.

I do not mean this to be disrespectful but I do think it is accurate to describe the "political philosophy" of this administration as one of "reality TV."  I think it is simply a fact that the President's information and influence activities strategy is based on the principles of success for reality TV.

I do hope the President will take seriously the name "Freedom's Frontier" and will work to protect freedom and liberty everywhere throughout the world against our enemies who seek authoritarian government expansion and domination, to include China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea as well as the non-state violent extremist actors.

Of course the visit to JSA/Panmunjom was long planned.  I am sure it was in the works from the time it was agreed that he would travel to South Korea after the G20.  But it will be interesting to some day learn the history - was this meeting really based on a tweet and the President's last minute idea to tweet and invite Kim and did Kim accept it on almost the spur of the moment?  If so it is also historic from the point of view that the north Korean bureaucracy/party apparatus worked as fast as it did.

It was a pretty amazing event.  But we should remember that we conferred a high  degree of legitimacy on Kim and this will be exploited by Kim's Propaganda and Agitation Department.  Some commentators have also mentioned that by this action we just accepted north Korea as a nuclear state (I hope we are not doing that but that is the view of some pundits)  I have to say that Kim looked the most at ease and relaxed both outside at the MDL and along conference row when they were talking to the press as well as at the sit down in the Peace House.  He appeared to be in his element and seemed to be relishing the exposure of the press conference even more than POTUS.  I wonder what was agreed to at the private session.  Hopefully real working level negotiations will take place.  It will be interesting to parse the statements from KCNA over the next few days to determine how Kim views this.  I am sure it will be interpreted as a huge win and that Kim is in full control of the nuclear negotiations and is in full control of his political warfare strategy and long con that he is executing agains the ROK and the U.S.

We need to think about these five questions:

1. What do we want to achieve in Korea?

2. What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia?

3. Who does Kim fear more: The US or the Korean people in the north? (Note it is the Korean people armed with information knowledge of life in South Korea)

4. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?

5. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula?  Has KJU given up its divide and conquer strategy - divide the alliance and conquer the ROK?

The answers to these questions should guide us to the strategy to solve the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice) and lead to the only acceptable durable political arrangement: A secure, stable, economically vibrant, non-nuclear Korean peninsula unified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.  In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK)

A tough and comprehensive strategic approach, or “Plan B,” is required while the U.S. still pursues working level negotiations to give Kim the opportunity to make the right strategic decision to denuclearize.  It must rest on a foundation of sustained pressure and military strength.  Should Kim not make the right strategic decision the U.S. and ROK/U.S. Alliance will have the strategy and forces in place to dissuade the regime from continued development of its capabilities and sustain the deterrent posture to prevent war. Finally, this “Plan B” provides a long-term approach to support reaching what may be the only solution to the Korean security problem: a unified peninsula or a United Republic of Korea.

In short my assumptions are these:  

Kim will not give up nuclear weapons unless he perceives the greater threat is from maintaining them –  a threat that must come from within the regime.

The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and threats, as well as the crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that rules the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State, is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea (UROK) that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.

To that end we need a concept that is based on "Deter, Contain, Manage, and Press: " deter north Korean aggression and attack on the South, contain the north's illicit activities around the world to include cyber and proliferation activities, manage the conditions and sustain alliances in the region, and continue maximum pressure 2.0 to influence internal regime dynamics that result in the internal threats that will cause Kim Jong-un to make the right strategic choices.

This concept should employ five major lines of effort: Diplomatic Engagement, Military Strength to deter an attack and support strategic reassurance and strategic resolve, Sanctions Enforcement, Cyber Defense and Offense, and Information and Influence activities to influence the regime elite, 2d tier leadership, and general population.

In the end to counter Kim's political warfare strategy and long con we have to outplay him with our long game.

Giving Tuesday Recommendations

  Dear Friends,  I do not normally do this (except I did this last year and for the last few years now, too) and I certainly do not mean to ...