20 Characteristics of Special Operations by LTG Samuel V. Wilson

I think it is worth reviewing LTG (RET) Sam Wilson's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_V._Wilson) wise words on special operations -  in particular the 20 Characteristics of Special Operations (pay attention to numbers 11, 14 and 17 highlighted below) as well as the planning suggestions, 7 principles and 6 requirements for special operations.  I received a xerox copy of these as a young SF officer in the 1980's and have been carrying them around with me ever since.

20 Characteristics of Special Operations

by LTG Samuel V. Wilson

Special Operations is a root term/generic euphemism covering a wide gambit of special activities outside of conventional operations; examples are UW, PSYOP, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Direct Action (raids, snatches, heists), Diversions, and Deceptions,  Special Operations is a form of military judo -

NOT A GENTLEMAN'S GAME;  NO HOLDS BARRED.

1. Special Operations are POLITICAL in nature.

Special Operations are, by their very nature, more political than conventional operations.  The National Command

Authorities will surely be calling the shots.

2. Special Operations normally involve Three Steps:

            A.  Getting to the location of the operation.

            B.  Accomplishing the operation.

            C.  Returning from the operation.

3.  Joint in Concept, Execution, and Interdepartmental, as well.

Nearly always under the lead agency concept, the State Department will be controlling the situation.  State will exercise authority over the military options.

4.  Special Operations are strategic in impact and nature.

5.  The limitations for Special Operations are not the same as the limitations for Special Operations Forces:

That is, individual force capabilities usually exceed the operational capabilities which can be supported by logistics, OPSEC, INTEL, and POLITICAL concerns.

6.  There must be an upper limit on Special Operations mission force size.

Increasing the size of the forces involved in a Special Operations compromises many aspects of support and OPSEC capabilities.  Almost always a small vs. large force structure must be decided upon.  One must be careful not to see bogeymen behind every bush and go for largest of all available forces to stifle every contingency.  The smallest force to do the job makes possible many more operational alternatives.

7.  Special Operations are  HIGH RISK/HIGH GAIN.

8.  Special Operations are multi-disciplined, multi-environmental, and highly complex.

9.  Special Operations are characterized by centralized planning and decentralized execution.

10.    Special Operations are INTEL driven and INTEL dependent.

Historically, the most serious deficiencies have occurred with the requirements for complete, timely, accurate INTEL.  If there is a shortfall it will occur in this area.  Commonly, HUMINT is unavailable.

11.  Special Operations Forces have a limited number of DIRECT roles:

Special Operations Forces are trained for specific missions.  They are the most highly trained and proficient forces that the US possess but they are not the answer for every small contingency mission that comes along.  Many conventional forces are more proficient at conventional type missions than the SOF.  Even more specialized units exist and they should not be used outside their primary mission.  Just because a select force is in being, does not automatically mean that it is the BEST to use.  Politics will play in this decision, the HIGH RISK/HIGH GAIN nature of the specific operation may cause the political leaders to make this choice, even if better alternatives are available, i.e., such as have SEAL TEAM SIX do a routine beach recon.

12.  Special Operations Forces play at the leading edge of operational and technical art.

SOF may need/develop new tactics.  They frequently need to acquire new and specialized equipment outside normal service/procurement channels.

13.  Special Operations pose the frequent requirement for extraordinary effort from both men and machines.

14.  In war, Special Operations are supplemental to the main issue.

15.  Special Operations, in peacetime, are politically costly if failures, but politically useful nonetheless.

16.  Special Operations Forces are CHEAP.

17.  Special Operations and LIC should not be confused.

Special Operations are activities, LIC is an environment; wherein Special Operations may operate but many conventional units may as well, LIC is not exclusively a Special Operations environment.

18.  Special Operations people are PECULIAR.

19.  Special Operations Forces are perceived differently:

SOF are often viewed by the conventional commanders as a thorn in their side.  They are thought of as threatening because of the political liabilities attendant with Special Operations.  They are seen as "Cowboys, Rambos" etc.  The State Department perceives SOF as "knuckle draggers,"  the military option is one of last resort and when necessary, it is seen as a failure of negotiation and diplomacy, State's primary tools.

20.  INTEGRITY, HONESTY, AND LOYALTY.

            A.  Need to take a moral bath.

            B.  Special Operations are very decentralized in execution and conducive to improprieties.

Improprieties, because of the political sensitivity of SO mission, cause long term mistrust within the command structure that take hard work and many years to overcome.

Special Operations Planning Suggestions

by LTG Samuel V. Wilson

(staffs at the OSD, CINC, MACOM level with an interagency perspective)

1.  [To the chief of staff or staff director]  Make sure someone is in charge, the mission is well defined, and everyone knows it.  Give him a deputy, and name a number 3, as well. [Unity of Command]

2.  Use a BIGOT list:  limit the number of players - keep a list of who knows and who needs to know about the operation.

3.  Someone needs to work the response to the press.

            a.  Name someone to handle this area.

            b.  Do not let the media force the action.

            c.  Use a PAO that you can trust with the media.

            d.  Have a MEDIA avoidance plan - never leave out.

            e.  Need a "How to avoid spotlight at end" plan.

4.  DO NOT FORGET THE MAN AT THE END OF THE LINE (Almost invariably the President gets involved), the poor guy holding the dike at the scene gets lost - do not leave him twisting in the wind - get info to him.  Get the troops moving towards the objective, give then advanced warning, move them closer.

5.  Make sure the requisite skills are contained within the planning cell, from the beginning!

            a.  Communicators

            b.  Logisticians

            c,. Political Advisors

            d.  Intel (DIA, CIA, etc.)

            e.  PSYOP

            f.  Legal advisor

            g.  Fiscal officer

            h.  Medical officer

            i. weather officer

Bring in INTEL at the beginning, followed in lockstep by communications and logistics types.  Make them part of the planning process at every juncture.  Then, if they are smart, they will often see what you need before you can articulate your requirement. In this connection, take care in short circuiting the system to get immediate answers to your INTEL questions.  Therein lies the danger.

6.  Start planning in a detailed and complex manner - Categorize--Parse--Mensurize--Simplify.  Get the Vital essence.  Special Operations planning of necessity will be complex in the beginning.  Better to start complex and then simplify, rather than to start simple and evolve to complex levels.

7.  Review existing contingency plans.

            Do not throw out the 1st game plan and reinvent the wheel.

8.  REMEMBER THE LESSONS OF PAST OPERATIONS.

            We cannot afford to not know history and repeat our own or anyone else's' failures.  Use OLD HEADs to review and challenge.

9.  By its very nature, Special Operations planning places a high emphasis on initiative, intuition, and daring. 

Get a WILD thinker, a nut, and let him brainstorm.  The 19th or 20th time around he will have something of value.

10.  Operational Security for Planning

            a.  Sin qua non

            b.  Do not carry OPSEC to extremes, use BIGOT list

            c.  Within the planning circle share everything

            d.  Be sensitive to time zones, especially east (grave yard shifts are work zones in east)         

            e.  Apply/ practice strictest OPSEC with outsiders.

11.  In planning, allow for initiative but include it in the plan.  Cover every conceivable exigency.

12.  Avoid excessive recall and abort points, it invites meddling from above.

13.  Plan to avoid micromanagement from the top.  The tendency to meddle and micromanage is clearly present, plan to overcome it.  Block out/head off opportunities for senior-level micromanagement.

14.  Have someone keep a log of events and decisions for the obvious inquisition.

15.  War gaming is important especially in Risk Assessment of "worst-case" scenarios.  wargame your plans.  Test over and over again.  Find the weak points and shore them up.

16.  Line up all the possible viewers of the event and understand the perceptions of all in a "what-if" environment.

17.  Haste makes waste-- "Pace" rest your people.

            a.  Tell people when you don't know something.

            b.  Don't cause your subordinates problems by pressuring them for answers.

18.  Avoid last minute changes LIKE THE PLAGUE.

20.  Those who write Special Operations plans for contingencies should do the same for exercises, train like you fight.

21.  REST.  Plan for it and see that people get it.

Six Requirements of Special Operations

by LTG Samuel V. Wilson

1.  The requirement for Elite Forces with Multiple Capability.

2.  The OVERWHELMING requirement for security, cover, and deception.

3.  The requirement for force protection capabilities.

4.  The requirement for Highly Secure, Redundant, Lightweight Communication Equipment and Capabilities.

5.  The requirement for Special Weapons and Equipment, often non-standard.

6.  The requirement for a High-level Patron.  Need strong personalities capable of providing effective influence for SOF in both the senior executive and legislative branches.

Seven Principles of Special Operations

by LTG Samuel V. Wilson

1.  Principle of the Initiative.

            The initiative is not reactive.

2.  The Principle of Security.

3.  The Principle of Surprise.

4.  The Principle of Intelligence.

5.  The Principle of Speed/Mobility.

            Operations to be executed quickly and violently.

6.  The Principle of Coordination and Training.

7.  The Principle of Delegation and Authority.

            The plan is centralized, execution must be decentralized.

And I would just add a few quotes to the Warlord's excellent commentary on SOF:

"Unconventional Warfare (UW) ... remains uniquely Special Forces'. 

It is the soul of Special Forces: the willingness to accept its

isolation and hardships defines the Special Forces soldier. Its

training is both the keystone and standard of Special Forces Training: it has long

been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide

operations, that "If you can do the UW missions, you can do all others."

The objective of UW and Special Forces' dedication to it is expressed in

Special Forces' motto: De Oppresso Liber (to free the oppressed)."[1]

- Robert M. Gates, Remarks at dedication of OSS Memorial

"Men, Special Forces is a mistress. Your wives will envy her because she will have your hearts. Your wives will be jealous of her because of the power to pull you away. This mistress will show you things never before seen and experience things never before felt. She will love you, but only a little, seducing you to want more, give more, die for her. She will take you away from the ones you love, and you will hate her for it, but leave her you never will, but if you must, you will miss her, for she has a part of you that will never be returned intact.

And in the end, she will leave you for a younger man." James R. Ward, OSS

THE WARLORD ON SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

John Collins

http://warontherocks.com/2013/09/warlord-on-special-operations-forces/

September 10, 2013 · in Commentary and Analysis

Editor’s Note: This speech was originally given to the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, Camp Mackall, NC, 11 December 2008 by the author, Colonel (ret.) John Collins. And it remains rock solid, just like the author who has been an invaluable mentor to many on WOTR as the founder and leader of the Warlord Loop.  

Vice Admiral James Stockdale, a Medal of Honor recipient and H. Ross Perot’s Vice Presidential running mate in 1992, opened his first and only televised appearance with these words: “Who am I? Why am I here?” His audience never did figure that out, but I’m going tell you right up front who I really am and why I’m here.

My Credentials

I’m a paper-pusher with no decorations for valor. I’m an honorary member of Special Forces Chapter XIII in Korea, but remain a wannabe who never wore a green beret and briefly served with only one Special Ops outfit more than 40 years ago. That makes me feel like Elizabeth Taylor’s eighth husband on their wedding night: I know what I’m supposed to do, but I’m not sure how to make it interesting, because my knowledge about SOF is almost all second hand.

Even so, I take comfort from long-standing close contact with a slew of icons like Bill Yarborough, who convinced President Kennedy that Army Special Forces possessed the capabilities he needed to combat Communist insurgencies; Sam Wilson, who helped convince Congress that it should create a U.S. Special Operations Command; and Barbwire Bob Kingston, who helped convince top-level decision-makers that Delta Force could provide the USA with much needed counterterrorism capabilities. Those great men all called me John and I called them by their first name, which is General.

My Past Contributions

Given their guidance and endless hours probing masterpieces by Special Ops groundbreakers like Mao Zedung, David Galula, and Sir Robert Thompson, I produced four surveys that publicized Special Operations Forces (SOF) favorably on Capitol Hill and beyond, when virtually every command, control, planning, and force posture problem reflected misunderstandings. Few members of Congress or flag officers in any U.S. military service fully appreciated Special Ops capabilities, limitations, and relationships with the rest of this great Nation’s national security apparatus. Scores of military and civilian authorities enlightened me during individual and roundtable discussions, then savaged each draft before publication.

First came an April 1987 House Armed Services committee print entitledU.S. and Soviet Special Operations, which reappeared commercially asGreen Berets, SEALs, and Spetsnaz. Several heavy hitters, including former CIA Director Bill Colby, expressed approval on the back cover. I’ll never tell anybody how much I paid ‘em.

Three years later that same committee published 60 low-intensity conflict case summaries that identified causes of success and failure during the Twentieth Century. That compilation soon resurfaced as America’s Small Wars: Lessons for the Future.

Correspondence on 30 March 1993 from me to General Carl Stiner, USSOCOM’s second commander, said, “I would like to prepare a ‘no bullshit’ unclassified report for Congress, not just another ‘gosh, gee whiz’ summation.”  He cooperated. So did JCS Chairman General Colin Powell, who opened doors that Stiner could not. National Defense University Press distributed the results entitled Special Operations Forces: An Assessment.

Finally, I traced SOF ups and down since 1670, when Captain Benjamin Church, the original Ranger, began trailblazing during King Philip’s War – - I was still a schoolboy during those days and the United States of America wasn’t even a dream. My five chapters, which followed Pete Schoomaker’s Overview, consumed half of U.S. Special Operations Forces, a giant coffee table book that has made a grand doorstop since 2003.

Personal Opinions

The world little noted nor long remembered any of those potboilers, most of which are long out of print, so my mission this morning is to cherry pick and update bits that you might find particularly useful regarding SOF Truths, mission priorities, Special Ops responsibilities compared with those of CIA, strategic shortcomings that make your job more difficult than it should be, and finally identify ways to reinforce SOF strengths and reduce SOF weaknesses.

Humor me. Take notes. Act like you really believe that what I’m about to say is important.

SOF Truths

Many true believers throughout USSOCOM have memorized SOF Truths, the first four of five bullets that I conceived and Congressman Earl Hutto signed in the Foreword to U.S. and Soviet Special Operations on 28 April 1987:

• Humans are more important than hardware.
• Their quality is more important than quantities.
• Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced.
• Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur.

When General Stiner sent me on a Cook’s tour of his subordinate commands in 1993 the first stop was Fort Bragg, where United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) commander Lieutenant General Wayne Downing proudly concluded his formal presentation with a slide that displayed SOF Truths. He did a double take when I told him “they’re wonderful,” then said, “I wrote ‘em.”

(Continued at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2013/09/warlord-on-special-operations-forces/

The Benghazi Awakening

I think the press (both the press ignoring this issue and the press that is fanning the flames) and the Congress are not looking at all the key issues and are instead focused too narrowly on the events and what could have or should have happened and on the talking points and the partisan aspect of this.  My previous thoughts on this from Novermber 4th are at this link and I think many of them are still valid today: http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2012/11/my-thoughts-on-benghazi.html

This is a where you stand depends on where you sit issue.  As I listen to various people retell the events I would guess that they are providing an accurate account of what they know happened where they were and what they think happened elsewhere.  But there are a lot of blind men with their hands feeling the elephant.  

But in my opinion there are four major issues to be examined in detail and unfortunately the actual events of that night and the responses are the sole focus.  What happened that night is a there but for the grace…. Anyone who has been involved in crisis action decision making with multiple HQ and authorities and services and agencies across time zones and continents knows full well how screwed up the operation can become.  

The first issue goes back years and that is how AFRICOM  was organized and resourced and our procedures for crisis action response to attacks on American interests (in Africa and around the world).  There "sharing" of resources among two Combatant Commanders is an obvious violation of the principle of unity of command.  We have dropped the ball here going back to the Bush Administration. 

The second issue is the AQ decline or analysis saying it is weakening from the administration.  Did this "narrative" contribute to poor prior decisions, failure to recognize the intell and take appropriate defense measures.  I think the decisions of the entire summer of 2012 need to be thoroughly examined and a determination made regarding whether the AQ decline analysis was genuine (but wrong) or was a result of a desire to have such a narrative support certain policies.  Did this analysis contribute to the poor decisions throughout the summer of 2012?  Was the analysis objective but wrong or was the analysis tainted and still wrong?

The third issue is our strategic decision making paralysis that is a result of our very effective capture/kill operations to include the drone program where we have the initiative and the greatest possible situational awareness in order to support decision making.  The events of that night in Egypt, Tunis, the Sudan, Tripoli, and Benghazi paralyzed our decision making ability as we tried to figure what was happening and what might happen.  I say this because I think our most significant action that night was to put up a drone to see what was going on.   We were trying to gain situational awareness and understanding before we made decisions – thus violating one of the critical rules of Special Operations from LTG Sam Wilson – never forget the man at the end of the line and always first get the forces alerted and moving toward the objective area (because especially in a place like Africa you cannot solve the physics problem of time and distance).  Furthermore the comments from senior military leaders about not knowing the situation and therefore not sending troops in is an indication of our risk averseness due to our expectations of executing successful operations based on near perfect situational awareness.

The last issue is the post event spin.  If the post event spin is determined to have been in support of the weakened AQ threat narrative then that confirms the problems in issue two above and then that is a significant issue.

The events of that night could have gone in many different directions for better or worse.  But the outcome is a result of events, policies, and strategies put in place long before that night.  And as critical as I might be of the Administration and its actions I do not think they deliberately hung our people out to dry during the actual crisis itself (but I do think it is likely that prior mistakes as I have outlined above may have significantly contributed to our  failure of September 12).  But mistakes were made in the heat of action but they were the result of a combination of factors that should be thoroughly examined and then we can let the chips fall where they may in regards to political fallout. More importantly we need to learn and adapt and hopefully next time we can do a better job of anticipating.  But before we call for everyone's head I wish Congress would investigate the entire incident with a critical look at everything leading up to it and not just want happened and the spin that followed from a purely partisan perspective.  Truth and understanding need to come first and then partisanship can follow.
V/R
Dave

• REVIEW & OUTLOOK
• Updated May 9, 2013, 2:42 p.m. ET

The Benghazi Awakening

Hillary Clinton's chief of staff told Greg Hicks not to talk to Congress.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324244304578471361393154072.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_AboveLEFTTop

Miracles happen, and even the sleepy Washington press corps seems to have paid some attention to Wednesday's House hearing on the attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission last September in Benghazi. What they and the public heard is the beginning of a real accounting for a security failure that killed four Americans.

We say "beginning" because the entire story still isn't clear, in particular the roles played by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama before and after the attack. But the hearing led by House Republicans, amid months of media sneering, gave the civil servants who were on duty that September night a chance to give their side of the story.

Gregory Hicks, the former deputy chief of mission at the embassy in Tripoli, recalled his last conversation with Ambassador Christopher Stevens, who told him, "Greg, we're under attack." Mr. Hicks said he knew then that Islamists were behind the assault. In other words, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice's public claim at the time that an anti-Islam YouTube video spurred the assault was known inside the government to be false when she and White House spokesman Jay Carney said it.

Mr. Hicks said he briefed Mrs. Clinton that night, yet the father of victim Tyrone Woods says she later told him that the YouTube video maker would be "prosecuted and arrested" as if he were responsible for Benghazi. Stranger still, Mr. Hicks says Mrs. Clinton's then chief of staff, Cheryl Mills, ordered him not to give solo interviews about the attack to a visiting Congressional delegation. Aficionados of the Clinton Presidency will recall Ms. Mills as one of Bill Clinton's impeachment lawyers.

After Stevens and an aide were killed at the mission, the militias turned on the CIA annex nearby. On the advice of the military attaché in Tripoli, Mr. Hicks said he asked for U.S. fighter planes to fly over the complex in an attempt to scare the attackers away. Libyans had seen U.S. air power during the NATO military intervention in 2011 and might have fled. But Mr. Hicks was told no planes were available. Early the next morning, two Americans died in a mortar attack on the CIA compound.

The Pentagon says no F-16s were on call that night, but why not? Why weren't contingency plans in place? The State Department's supposedly independent review panel said in December that "there simply was not enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference." The review blamed lower level officials for the security failure and didn't even bother to interview Mrs. Clinton. Mr. Hicks says he was "effectively demoted" after Benghazi from "deputy chief of mission to desk officer."

(Continued at the link below)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324244304578471361393154072.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_AboveLEFTTop