tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2760249550318021070.post3737300668168404633..comments2023-10-18T10:34:47.931-04:00Comments on IINSTP: Why the United States Needs a National Political Warfare Center and Regional EmbassiesInformal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitionershttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05781379315486039302noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2760249550318021070.post-11421695928405848892016-06-10T14:07:45.504-04:002016-06-10T14:07:45.504-04:00I don't know. Although Johnston presents a com...I don't know. Although Johnston presents a compelling case, his thesis leaves me somewhat hinky over authorities, implementation, and consequences. I still recall from the early 80's discussions about spinning off SF into a hybrid Title 50/10 type of organization that would merge the spy with the soldier. This desire to be the "un-military" seems to be an ongoing theme in the SOF community. <br />I don't dispute his assertions about the disconnects between desired policy outcomes and structural inabilities to integrate and synchronize all elements of national power. There is no effective mechanism that links policy to coordinated implementation, especially in this administration where the NSC is an adjunct staff to the West Wing insiders. And we saw the problems with State trying to take the lead for stability ops in Iraq/Afg. But I can't help but be reminded of the Roman Imperium. <br />When you consider that SOF is the persistent military force for Ph I shaping, it does seem natural for their prominent role as the legatus to the proconsul. <br />That still leaves out the Title 10 role of the military - are they the tribunes? That dangerously places SOF in the higher political context of civ-mil relationships. <br />Perhaps I'm misreading the intent, or Cassandra is trying to get my attention. But I see real problems turning this concept into reality. <br />Kurt VanderSteennoreply@blogger.com