It could, instead, try to train two-speed soldiers capable of conducting conventional and unconventional operations; or, it could keep COIN as a core function of an enhanced SOCOM with the capability to train conventional forces in unconventional tactics should a large expeditionary COIN mission be deployed. This monograph concludes that the forth option best equips the Army for the contemporary security environment. It then makes specific recommendations for implementing this option and suggests the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)-Philippines as the model for future COIN campaigns. Finally, the monograph maintains that an enhanced special operations forces (SOF) capability will not adversely affect preparation for conventional war-fighting. Improving the conventional forces’ tooth-to-tail ratio, continuing to develop labor-saving technologies, and relying on contractors to perform support functions can offset reallocation of personnel to SOCOM.
83. Details on SOF support for Philippine military from JimMichaels, “Philippines a model for counterinsurgency,” USAToday, available from usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
world/2011-03-30-secretwar30_ST_N.htm, accessed on November 27, 2015.84. Colonel Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COINOperation: OEF-PHILIPPINES and the Indirect Approach,” MilitaryReview: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army, Vol. LXXXVI,No. 6, November-December 2006, p. 6. 7785. Ibid., pp. 7-8.86. Michaels, “Philippines a model for counterinsurgency.”